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Abstract 
Uncertainty surrounds the public understanding of climate change, and provides fertile 
ground for conspiracy theories. Typically, such conspiracy theories assert that climate 
scientists and politicians are distorting or hijacking the science to suit their own 
purposes. Climate change conspiracy theories resemble other conspiracy theories in 
some respects, but in other respects they appear to be quite different. For example, 
climate change conspiracy theories appear to be motivated by the desire to deny or 
minimize an unwelcome and threatening conclusion. They also appear to be more 
contentious than other types of conspiracy theories. Perhaps to an unparalleled extent, 
people on both sides of the issue champion climate change conspiracy theories. Finally, 
more than other conspiracy theories, those concerning climate change appear to be more 
politically loaded, dividing opinion across the left-right continuum. Some empirical 
evidence suggests that climate change conspiracy theories may be harmful, steering 
people away from environmentally friendly initiatives. They therefore present a 
significant challenge for governments and environmental organizations that are 
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In 2006 hurricane expert Bill Gray, an emeritus professor of atmospheric science at 
Colorado State University, called global warming “one of the greatest hoaxes ever 
perpetrated on the American people” (Achenbach, 2006) and said that after a period of 
warming, the Earth would begin to cool again in three to eight years. Eight years on, the 
Earth is still warming (NASA, 2014) but, if anything, the voices alleging conspiracy 
have become louder. 
 
When prominent experts such as Gray speak, people listen. As an expert on 
meteorology, he is a trusted source of information about the world’s climate. Other 
well-known climate skeptics include US Senator James Inhofe, who wrote The Greatest 
Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future (2012) and again 
chairs the Senate’s Environment and Public Works Committee; former Northern Irish 
environmental minister Sammy Wilson; former US vice presidential candidate Sarah 
Palin; and former president of the Czech Republic Václav Klaus (Monbiot, 2009). 
 
When people are unsure of the facts and lack the necessary knowledge and skills to 
interpret data themselves, they understandably turn to trusted experts to guide their 
opinions and behaviors. However, when people listen to climate skeptics, they enter a 
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minefield of mistrust, suspicion, and doubt. By no means do all skeptics advance 
conspiracy theories to discredit mainstream science and environmental policy. 
Nonetheless, theories abound that assert climate scientists are faking their data to obtain 
more research funding. Or, global warming is an attempt to promote nuclear power. Or, 
it is a scam cooked up by people who own shares in renewable energy companies. Or, it 
is a myth spread by environmentalists in the pursuit of a one-world socialist 
government. These are all conspiracy theories that have the power to influence what 
people think and do. 
 
Climate change conspiracy theories resemble other conspiracy theories in some 
respects, but in other respects they may be uniquely harmful, steering public opinion 
and policy away from efforts to reduce, and adapt to, the impacts of global warming. 
Although conspiracy theories are more common, and more studied, than ever before, 
psychologists have paid relatively little attention to the unique properties of climate 
change conspiracy theories. This article attempts to identify what such theories have in 
common with, and what might set them apart from, other conspiracy theories. 
 
Out of the ordinary 
Generally, when something big happens, such as the death of a president or a terrorist 
attack on a major city, people want answers. But for many people the answers given by 
officialdom are not enough. Instead they turn to allegations of collusion, intrigue, and 
cover-ups. Popularly known as conspiracy theories, these allege that such events are the 
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secret actions of powerful and malevolent groups—rather than accidents, natural 
occurrences, or the overt actions of officially identified perpetrators (McCauley and 
Jacques, 1979). Conspiracy theories are a prevalent feature of contemporary culture, 
assisted by the ease and speed of digital communication (Coady, 2006). They capture 
public awareness, drawing attention away from conclusions supported by scientific 
evidence and logic and toward explanations that involve complex schemes and plots. 
 
Conspiracy theories range from outlandish (for example, that Barack Obama and other 
world leaders are reptiles in human guise) to unproven (that the US government was at 
least complicit, and at worst responsible, for the 9/11 attacks) to true (the Watergate 
affair and the Tuskegee syphilis scandal). Other well-known conspiracy theories include 
the notion that Lee Harvey Oswald worked with the CIA to assassinate President John 
F. Kennedy; that elements within the British establishment killed Diana, Princess of 
Wales; and that NASA faked the Apollo moon landings. In general, people find it 
difficult to believe that such significant events can be explained by mundane or ordinary 
details (Leman and Cinnirella, 2007). 
 
Climate change is perhaps a supreme example of this “proportionality bias.” It is a 
global-scale event with enormous significance, and is portrayed by scientists and 
governments as a consequence of small, everyday factors such as the transport we use. 
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that there are many conspiracy theories about climate 
change. Such theories typically postulate that global warming is not happening and 
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instead that scientific findings are being exaggerated or fabricated by people who have 
something to gain. Because they all have this thread in common, they are often referred 
to collectively as the Great Global Warming Conspiracy. However, the motives and 
perpetrators identified by the various theories are not always the same. Among the most 
popular theories: 
 
Scientists are making it up for political reasons. According to this theory, scientists are 
fabricating or tweaking their data to gain political power and to support politicians’ 
strivings for power. For example, Bill Gray has argued that global warming gives 
scientists and politicians a cause that will allow them to “organize, propagandize, force 
conformity and exercise political influence” (Achenbach, 2006). In short, this theory 
argues that the case for global warming is a political stunt. 
 
Scientists are making it up to get research funding. An alternative theory, but one that 
still blames the scientists, is that data are fabricated or distorted because climate 
scientists generally struggle to secure research funding. Alarming data increase the 
likelihood that future research will be supported, so climate scientists are motivated to 
lie about their data to increase their chances of success. This theory implies that a 
cohesive cabal of climate scientists have managed to con governments worldwide and 




Global warming is a green scam. Another conspiracy theory argues that because many 
people have invested in renewable energy companies, they stand to lose a lot of money 
if global warming is shown to be a myth. According to this theory, environmental 
groups therefore bribe climate scientists to doctor their data so that they are able to 
secure their financial investment in green energy. 
 
Global warming is an attempt to promote nuclear power. Although its life cycle is not 
entirely carbon-free, nuclear power production emits relatively small amounts of the 
greenhouse gas carbon dioxide, and therefore does not contribute significantly to global 
warming. One of the many claims made in the 2007 British documentary “The Great 
Global Warming Swindle” is that the threat of global warming is an attempt to promote 
nuclear power. Ultimately, companies in the nuclear sector stand to profit if nations 
become more dependent on nuclear power. Indeed, any scheme that puts a price on 
carbon emissions is likely to benefit nuclear power. 
 
Similarities and differences 
In the examples above, the alleged conspirators are driven by either political power or 
money. This is much the same for many other conspiracy theories. For example, some 
argue that the 9/11 attacks were all about oil, that Princess Diana was murdered because 
she posed a threat to British political stability, and that President Kennedy was 
assassinated because he was unpopular with powerful people and groups such as the 
CIA and the Mafia. Someone always had something to gain—financial or political (or 
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both)—from these events. Similarly, all climate change conspiracy theories surmise that 
global warming is a scam manufactured by those who have something to gain from it 
(although the perpetrators vary from theory to theory). 
 
But this may be where the similarities between climate change conspiracy theories and 
other popular conspiracy theories end. So far, social scientists have not conducted 
systematic research to examine exactly how belief in conspiracy theories about climate 
change is similar to, or different from, other conspiracy beliefs. While researchers await 
a new wave of studies focused on climate change conspiracy beliefs, comparing climate 




One key difference is that people have multiple, deep-seated reasons to believe in 
climate change conspiracy theories. Most people prefer to believe that they are part of 
an enduring and moral social group that can be confident and strong in the face of 
conflict and threat (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Wohl et al., 2010). They also prefer to 
perceive themselves as moral individuals. Indeed, self-enhancement—the motivation to 
feel good about oneself and maintain self-esteem—is seen as universal (Sedikides et al., 
2003). Although sometimes unrealistic, people are also motivated to believe that they 
are headed toward a bright future and that they should be optimistic about their 
prospects (Weinstein, 1980). It is obviously more pleasant to hold these beliefs than not 
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to hold them. More than that, these beliefs appear to be fundamental to people’s ability 
to function effectively (Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
 
Climate change presents a powerful threat to these fundamental and cherished beliefs 
about the morality of individuals (Bandura, 2007) and the legitimacy of societies 
(Feygina et al., 2010). The key psychological appeal of climate change conspiracy 
theories, then, may be that they discredit the apparently overwhelming evidence that 
humans are contributing to the destruction of their own environment. Denial of climate 
change is likely to do a lot more for people’s general sense of equanimity than, say, 
believing that Princess Diana was murdered. Climate change conspiracy theories may 
therefore be a politically significant type of “motivated reasoning” (Kunda, 1990)—in 
which information that challenges valued beliefs is discounted, while information that 
supports them is accepted uncritically. Of course, it is possible for people to doubt the 
evidence for anthropogenic climate change without subscribing to conspiracy theories 
(for example, a person may believe that the planet is warming due to natural cycles), but 
the two are clearly correlated (Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Lieserowitz, 2006). 
 
A related feature of climate change conspiracy theories is that they appear to be 
politically loaded, dividing opinion according to people’s position on the spectrum 
between right and left. With the right wing emphasizing the production of wealth rather 
than its redistribution, and opposing governmental regulation and interference, it is not 
surprising that right-wing political identification is associated with disbelief in climate 
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change. This type of disbelief is unlike the rejection of mainstream science surrounding 
other controversial topics such as vaccination and genetically modified foods. However, 
as cognitive psychologist Stephan Lewandowsky and his colleagues have shown (2013), 
people who have a conspiracist view of the world and who subscribe to a range of 
conspiracy theories are more likely to reject the mainstream scientific consensus on all 
three topics. 
 
Motivated reasoning may help explain why the mounting scientific evidence of climate 
change only seems to have yielded more and more conspiracy theorizing and 
controversy. Researchers have shown that exposure to scientific evidence about climate 
change can polarize opinion, rather than informing it in the rational way that one might 
expect (Kahan et al., 2012). When climate scientists are seen as part of a left-wing elite 
arguing for social change, their findings may be sharply rejected. It may seem perfectly 
reasonable for climate scientists to point to the impact of climate change on the world’s 
least powerful people, for example. However, such arguments appeal more to liberals 
than conservatives (Markowitz and Shariff, 2012). Couching arguments in terms of 
conservative moral values, such as a concern for purity (for example, of the 
environment), could potentially help defuse the perception that liberal scientists are 





Another important and possibly unique feature of conspiracy theories about climate 
change is that there are powerful theories on both sides of the debate. With regard to 
topics such as 9/11, President Kennedy, and the Apollo moon landings, there is a single 
mainstream explanation opposed by one or more conspiracy theories. In the case of 
climate change, however, conspiracy theories that dispute the official account (that 
humans are inducing dangerous levels of climate change) are countered by others that 
affirm it. Indeed, some of these counter-conspiracy theories suggest that the official 
account has not been put firmly enough. A core proposition of many, including 
arguments put forward by organizations such as Greenpeace (Gibson, 2012), is that 
industrialists are orchestrating and funding a campaign to sow seeds of doubt and denial 
in public opinion (Fischer, 2013). 
 
Other conspiracy theories refer less to byzantine scheming than to backroom political 
machinations. For example, National Geographic reported (Howard, 2014) that 
important information about greenhouse gas emissions in China was removed from the 
summary for policy makers prepared from the fifth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change assessment. The apparently intentional suppression of information that may be 
politically inconvenient raises concern about the international politicization of climate 
change—specifically, that evidence of its seriousness and of its links to human behavior 




Counter-conspiracy theories may gain less airtime than those that underpin the denial of 
climate change. Nonetheless, they draw empirical support from extensive analyses of 
documented links between industrial interests, think tanks, and prominent climate 
skeptics (Dunlap and Jacques, 2013; Oreskes and Conway, 2010)—and indeed from 
recent evidence that these links are becoming more byzantine and untraceable (Brulle, 
2013). In short, they may be largely warranted, even unavoidable, responses to the 
tactics of an opposing lobby aiming to discredit mainstream science and policy. 
 
No matter how plausible or warranted, the very existence of counter-conspiracies 
illustrates the corrosive and potentially recursive nature of conspiracy theorizing. In the 
climate change debate, conspiracy theories (for example, that scientists and 
governments are overstating risks for nefarious reasons) are themselves the subject of 
conspiracy theories (that industrialists are funding their dissemination). Both sides of 
the debate are therefore represented as insincere, and scientific data are represented as 
political tools rather than value-free observations of the world. This creates a climate of 
uncertainty and mutual distrust, which, especially when politicized, greatly undermines 
the possibility of rational debate and discourse about the appropriate policy response to 
scientific findings (Cohen, 2003). Perhaps most corrosive, the sum total of these effects 
is to create the impression that the climate change debate boils down to a choice 




In a world where people disbelieve science or are unsure about the meaning of scientific 
claims, the sources of conspiracy theories are extremely important. When people are 
unsure or lack confidence in data, they tend to rely on secondhand knowledge, typically 
presented by authoritative media sources. But when well-known and seemingly 
authoritative sources endorse conspiracy theories, as in the case of Bill Gray and others 
mentioned earlier, people are likely to take notice (Chaiken and Maheswaran, 1994). 
Known as “knowledge by authority” in philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce’s taxonomy 
of epistemology, reliance on others for information cannot guarantee impartiality or 
accuracy (Hovland and Weiss, 1951). Further, if climate change conspiracy theories 
make people doubtful of scientific claims, people may be less likely to support action or 
take measures to reduce the problem. 
 
Impacts of climate change conspiracy theories 
Although often parodied as inconsequential fantasies entertained by disenfranchised 
people on the fringes of society, conspiracy theories can influence what ordinary people 
intend to do in important domains. For example, social psychologist Daniel Jolley and 
one of the authors of this article asked people participating in a study to read a fictitious 
article about vaccines (Jolley and Douglas, 2014a). One set of participants read an 
article arguing that people within the vaccine industry are guilty of misrepresenting or 
hiding data about the efficacy and safety of vaccines, and that their actions are 
motivated by profit. These are typical conspiracy theories advocated by members of the 
anti-vaccine movement. The other study participants read a piece that refuted common 
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anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. The study reported that people in the first group, who 
were exposed to the anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, were more reluctant to have a 
fictional child vaccinated. 
 
Using a similar experimental design, other research has shown that people who read 
materials arguing that governments are involved in elaborate plots and schemes, such as 
the alleged 9/11 conspiracy, indicated a reluctance to vote in general elections compared 
to those who read information that refutes such conspiracy theories (Jolley and Douglas, 
2014b). Further, research has shown that people can be influenced by exposure to 
conspiracy theories without being aware that they have been persuaded (Douglas and 
Sutton, 2008). 
 
Of particular importance here, some recent research has explored the impact of climate 
change conspiracy theories. Jolley and Douglas (2014b) asked people to read a 
paragraph about climate change. In one condition, the paragraph contained information 
supporting conspiracy theories (for example, that climate scientists are doctoring their 
data); in another condition, the paragraph refuted the conspiracy theories. Exposure to 
conspiracy theories reduced people’s intentions to reduce their carbon footprint, relative 
to people who were given refuting information. 
 
So, what can (or should) be done about climate change conspiracy theories? While 
scholars are waiting for more studies of climate change conspiracies specifically, they 
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have suggested general strategies for undermining conspiracy theories to ensure public 
safety (for example, see Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). These strategies include 
banning conspiracy theories altogether, imposing financial disincentives (such as taxes) 
on people who disseminate such theories, and engaging in “cognitive infiltration”—
joining conspiracy groups and counter-arguing against their conspiracy claims. 
However, these suggestions are arguably undemocratic, unreasonable, and impractical. 
They may also backfire, and the likelihood of “conversion” using scientific evidence is 
limited because climate change denial increasingly reflects ideological positions (Bain 
et al., 2012). 
 
Instead of reactive approaches like these, it may instead be possible to take a proactive 
stance by addressing the underlying conditions that allow conspiracy theories to 
prosper. As in the field of medicine, approaches to climate change conspiracy theories 
could be therapeutic (akin to treating or curing an existing illness) or preventive (like 
seeking to avoid or reduce the occurrence of an illness). Several factors that are 
associated with conspiracy belief are alterable. Factors such as uncertainty (van Prooijen 
and Jostmann, 2013), feelings of powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), political 
cynicism (Swami, 2012), magical thinking (Barron et al., 2014), and errors in logical 
and probabilistic reasoning (Brotherton and French, 2014) are all associated with belief 
in conspiracy theories. Addressing these factors may decrease reliance on conspiracy 
explanations. For example, business professors Jennifer Whitson and Adam Galinsky 
(2008) showed that a lack of control increases belief in conspiracy theories. Therefore, 
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inducing instead a strong sense of control may reduce reliance on conspiracy theories. 
Future research will determine whether interventions are effective. They need not be 
tailored toward specific conspiracy theories, and they may have broader benefits such as 
improving openness and transparency in society, and critical and rational thinking in its 
citizens. 
 
Exploring the impact of climate change conspiracy theories is timely and important. 
They cannot be dismissed as trivial or harmless. Governments and environmental 
professionals need to be aware that conspiracy theories may be detrimental to their 
efforts to encourage pro-environmental action. A future challenge for researchers will 
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